For many decades our nation has been preoccupied with the dangers of communism on the one hand, or of the radical right on the other. All the while our Congress has been getting drunker and more out of control with spending, and ever more incapable of constructive legislation.

How it got off the track, why it stays there, and what we can do about it, are the subjects of discussion of two books -- one from each side of the political spectrum. Two eminent people have turned a revealing light on Congress and are essentially in agreement in regard to both diagnosis and cure of the monster Congress has become -- which gives much hope for the establishment of dialogue among those who would embrace our common ground.

Unfortunately, neither recognizes our debt-money system as the bottom-line reason for our inability to hold our Congressmen accountable. Until we address that, all else -- as Howard Phillips says -- will be only a holding action.

---

FOCUS ON CONGRESS

Reviews of Two Books:
a View from the Left, and a View from the Right,
Reveal WhatHappens
on that First Plane Ride to Washington

From The Treasury

Compiled by Jean Carpenter
Bound with Remarkable Remedy
Presented here with permission from the publisher
PRS Nutshells

View from the Left

RICHARD N. GOODWIN served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and in 1960 was assistant to the then Senator John F. Kennedy. In 1961, Goodwin became Assistant Special Counsel to President Kennedy, and subsequently served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs. Later, he was named Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson. He created the Alliance for Progress for Kennedy, and the Great Society for Johnson. In Promises to Keep -- A Call for a New American Revolution (Times Books, $15) he discusses in detail some of the problems alluded to in Remarkable Remedy. He then offers some interesting suggestions, supported with thoughtful reasoning, for putting restraints on out-of-control government. Following is a distillation of his suggestions É

• Reduce and limit campaign expenditures to a tiny fraction of current levels, and reduce and limit individual contributions as well. This would "in a single stroke, drastically diminish the power of wealth to corrupt the political process." In recent years the amount spent has increased dramatically -- and certainly has not bought us better government. Rather it has indebted the office holders -- and their accountability -- to their benefactors, not to the sovereign people.

• Require television stations to give equal time free to all candidates for public office who are qualified for election under state laws. This would ensure that we could see and hear all candidates and have enough information to make a real choice at the polls. Since we, the people, own the airwaves and lend them to the tele-vision stations, the stations have an obligation to the public. This would also drastically reduce the need for large campaign chests.

• Require congressional ratification of all administrative regulations as a means of overseeing the enforcement of general legislation. Agents rarely see the people they are supposed to protect from business abuse, but often see, both officially and socially, the leaders of the businesses they regulate. There is much documented evidence that agents often rule to the benefit of the regulated and to the detriment of the general welfare.

• A fixed term should be established for all administrative agencies. A periodic stirring up of the bureaucracy will help to break up the crystalline structure that is otherwise inevitable. Longevity gives power to bureaucrats, who outlast elected officials and exercise great influence over them -- by their superior knowledge of "the ropes" -- if for no other reason. Much governing is done today by people who are not elected and not accountable, and are administering unconstitutional projects.

• Require reducing and limiting congressional staffs and staff budgets. FDR ran a war with a smaller staff than any congressional committee chairman has today. These staffs are an easy conduit of influence for special interest, because elected officials tend to rely on them and their knowledge, rather than on themselves.

• Require to be a matter of public record contacts of members of Congress and executive departments with representatives of special interest including trips to resorts, and all other perquisites.

• Impose term limits on members of Congress. Power increases with longevity, and that power has more to do with "politics" than with governing. Newcomers' effectiveness is largely lost as they are forced into the power play. [Might it also have the adverse effect of increasing power of the perennial public servant staff? -- Ed.].

* * * * *

View from the Right

ERIC FELTEN, reports from the U.S. Congress Assessment Project. The Ruling Class -- Inside the Imperial Congress (The Heritage Foundation, $19.95). It solves the mystery of what happens to our Congressmen in both House and Senate on that first plane ride to Washington (as it turns out, when it really happens is long before take-off), and why we don't "throw all the bums out," though everyone agrees that we should.

The incentives for Congress to legislate have been turned upside down. In the course of two centuries the office of Congressman has evolved from that of time-out-to-do-his-turn-at-public-service into a full-time lucrative career. The incentives to represent the best interests of the nation in general and one's constituents in particular, have also evolved -- into doing whatever is most conducive to re-election. Unfortunately, those goals do not necessarily coincide.

As for the lucrative aspect, they have lost no opportunity to make it ever more so. The justification is that otherwise only the wealthy could afford to take time out for such service.

Perhaps they never thought of the down side, of which there are many factors -- only a minor one being the amount of money required for a hotly contested electoral campaign for a coveted place at the trough.

So how does this change in incentives impede legislation in actual practice? One might think that the goal of re-election would be an incentive to do the job well. Perhaps it would be such an incentive if all representatives were elected at large from the whole nation (not a viable solution, of course). But, they are accountable only to their own constituents. So their goal is to please as many of them as possible -- and anger as few as possible.

The problem is that this risky business of legislation usually pleases some and nearly always displeases others. The challenge is to get credit for what people do like while avoiding blame for what they don't like.

There are two ways they can handle that. Both are quite effective. One is to make it very difficult for anyone to know how they voted on controversial issues. They do it through various methods of "creative" rule-making. (Each House has constitutional authority to make its own rules, a fact they have "ingeniously" exploited.)

The other is to delegate the actual job of legislating to others. They either wink at committee members and committee staffs, or their own staffs, who slip things in "without their knowledge." (Who could ever expect them actually to read all those bills?!) Their own staffs are a shadow government of unelected, unaccountable pseudo-legislators who have much more to do with legislation than the legislators -- and their contacts with lobbyists are not open to public scrutiny! Or they pass vague bills for which administrative bureaucrats such as OSHA, EPA, IRS, and ADA, must fill in the blanks, thus avoiding the heat altogether.

The former is immoral. The latter is unconstitutional, because Congress may not abdicate or transfer to others its legitimate functions (Shechter Poultry v. United States of America, 29 U.S. 495, 55 U.S. 837, 842 [1935]). But neither of those judgments deters Congressmen from doing both.

If it all stopped there, the effect would be horrendous enough, yet still fairly neutral in terms of affecting their popularity. The goal is to endear themselves to all their constituents.

Several activities take care of that -- the funding for none of which is authorized by the Constitution.

One is to bring home the bacon -- in the form of pork: a new highway here, a parking garage there, a monument to some local hero in a park, a shopping mall somewhere else -- all attached as riders to popular bills, and unopposed by other legislators, who want votes for their own pork.

Another is what each neophyte in Congress learns first, from his own party machine, and is known in those venerable halls as "constituent service." Here all those administrative regulations (laws not passed by Congress) serve them well, giving rise to many opportunities to buffer their constituents from the steam roller of oppression caused by thousands of pages of regulations. Why rectify a problem that generates so many opportunities to earn brownie points with the voters?

Then they do other things to get name and face recognition at taxpayer expense: Congressional hearings thrive on victims and make few enemies. Television interviews by their own press agents are welcomed by local stations. (Congress has its own TV studio.)

To add insult to injury, Congressmen exempt themselves from many of the laws they lay down for others, setting themselves apart as a ruling elite and further reducing their accountability -- far from the intent of the Founding Fathers. [Will the 104th Congress rectify that?]

With a career Congress, voters and Congress alike face a dilemma: Voters hate paying taxes to Washington, so hope to get as much back as possible in pork and entitlements. With their share of the take at stake, they feel impelled to vote for the incumbent. On the other hand, a Congressman can exploit the system to win re-election, or face the hazards and difficulty of responsible legislating -- only to lose later at the polls. They lose not only because of not winning popular support, but because their own party machine is capable of scuttling their boat for not playing by the "rules." What can be done?

Congress must be forced to return to its function of legislating, eliminating all non-legislative powers; and the constitutional distinction between legislation and execution of the laws must be reaffirmed.

The Congress shall have power ... To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States.
-- Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8

And ...

Congress may not abdicate or transfer to others its legitimate functions.
-- Shechter Poultry v. United States of America, 29 U.S. 495, 55 U.S. 837, 842 [1935]

And ...

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
-- Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 1

And ...

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.
-- Tenth Amendment

Specific measures to accomplish these objectives include:

• Limitation of Terms. To limit terms would restore incentives to their upright position, freeing Congressmen to seek the overall good of the nation. [Might it also have the adverse effect of increasing power of the perennial public servant staff? -- Ed.]

• Limitation of Sessions. To limit sessions would allow citizen legislators to continue in their home jobs and remain a part of their community, identifying with community concerns.

• Drastic Cutting of Staff.

• Limitation of Spending and Balancing the Budget. Mr. Felten believes a constitutional amendment is the only way to bring discipline to congressional spending. [Without a return to honest money, however, that cannot be done without resulting economic chaos. See "Caper," in Remarkable Remedy p. 55.]

• Enhancement of the President's Role in Setting the Budget, Allowing Him a Line Item Veto. Without term limitation [or constitutional restraint] this is the only way to eliminate pork.

• Making Congress Obey the Laws.

• Application of Freedom of Information Act to Congress.
• Ending of the Constituent Service Racket. This would help to restore accountability and save tax dollars.

• Establishment of Fair and Open Procedures. Congress should revise its Rules to make all procedures fair and open. [Our thanks to Oklahoma's Congressman Jim Inhofe who recently made a start in this direction by winning a victory for a change in the Rules of the House to make a matter of public record the names of the members signing the Discharge Petition -- the method used for springing a bill out of committee. These names have been kept a deep dark secret for many years, allowing Congressmen to talk out of both sides of their mouths.]

• Cutting of Committees. A step toward restoring accountability. Specific measures, of course, will be required to end corruption that has become institutionalized.

It comes as no surprise that the basic problem is neglect of the restraints imposed upon Congress by the Constitution.

What here becomes clear is how the incentives and pressures have come into play as the impetus for that neglect. Congress is not generally made up of bad men, but of men without the strength to withstand almost intolerable pressures. Those who have that strength often fail to be re-elected (sometimes starved out by their own party) or voluntarily quit the arena.

The monster is not necessarily the result of malice aforethought, but of the weakness of men -- citizens and voters no less than the Congressmen themselves -- caught up in a rigged and fraudulent system that saps the strength and vitality of the nation.

Several generations have been brought up not to accept responsibility for their own welfare, to blame the government for all ills and look to it for all cures. Undoubtedly Pogo was right all along. "We have met the enemy É and he is us."

Goodwin brings to his book a wealth of background understanding from experience. Felten's book is replete with shocking and unforgettable facts. Both offer thoughful solutions, many of which will need to be applied before the body politic can again become whole. In any case, both deserve wide distribution because of their thorough anlyses of the symptoms as they pertain to Congress.

Yet, in all such public discussion the astute reader and listener will notice a veritable blackout of the core issue. Until we starve out the enemy by a return to honest money and other constitutional restraint, all else, as Howard Phillips says, is merely a holding action.